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Abstract. We present an analysis about subsidy policy for adoption of new technology in 
duopoly with differentiated goods under absolute and relative profit maximization. 
Technology itself is free, however, firms must expend fixed set-up costs to adopt new 
technology. There are various cases about optimal policies depending on the level of the 
set-up cost and whether the goods of the firms are substitutes or complements. In particular, 
under relative profit maximization there is a case such that the social welfare is maximized 
when one firm adopts new technology, but no firm adopts new technology without subsidy. 
Then, the government should give a subsidy to only one firm. It is a discriminatory policy. 
The government gives a chance to receive a subsidy to only one firm. 
Keywords. Subsidy for new technology adoption, Absolute and relative profit 
maximization, Duopoly. 
JEL. D43, L13. 
 
1. Introduction 
e present an analysis about subsidy policy for adoption of new 
technology in duopoly with differentiated goods under absolute and 
relative profit maximization. Technology itself is free, and production 
costs are lower with the new technology than the old technology. However, firms 
must expend fixed set-up costs for adoption of new technology, for example, 
education costs of their staffs. 
Theoretical justification of relative profit maximization is mainly based on 
evolutionary game theoretic point of view. Schaffer (1989) demonstrates with a 
Darwinian model of economic natural selection that if firms have market power, 
profit maximizers are not necessarily the best survivors. A unilateral deviation 
from Cournot equilibrium decreases the profit of the deviator, but decreases the 
other firm’s profit even more. On the condition of being better than other 
competitors, firms that deviate from Cournot equilibrium achieve higher payoffs 
than the payoffs they receive under Cournot equilibrium. He defines the finite 
population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS). It is a strategy of a player that 
maximizes his relative payoff. This is according to the following fact.  
 If there are both absolute payoff maximizing players and relative payoff 
maximizing players, then the latter players earn more absolute payoffs than the 
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former players; thus relative payoff maximizing strategy is more survival than 
absolute payoff maximizing strategy.  
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on human nature. 
Even if a person earns big money, he is not happy enough and may be 
disappointed, if his brother/sister or close friend earns bigger money. On the other 
hand, even if he is very poor but his neighbor is poorer, he may be consoled by that 
fact. Also firms in an industry do not only seek to improve their own performance 
but also want to outperform their rival firms. TV audience-rating race and market 
share competition by breweries, automobile manufacturers, convenience store 
chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in Japan, are examples of such 
behavior of firms. 
For analyses of relative profit maximization please see Gibbons & Murphy 
(1990), Lu (2011), Matsumura, Matsushima, & Cato (2013), Satoh, & Tanaka 
(2013), Tanaka (2013a), Schaffer (1989), Satoh, & Tanaka (2014), Tanaka 
(2013b). Vega-Redondo (1997), in a framework of evolutionary game theory, 
showed that the equilibrium in a Cournot duopoly with a homogeneous good under 
relative profit maximization is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium, that is, 
the price of the good is equal to the marginal cost. If the goods are differentiated, 
however, we obtain an equilibrium which is not equivalent to the competitive 
equilibrium. See Satoh, & Tanaka (2014) and Tanaka (2013b). 
In Hattori, & Tanaka (2014) adoption of new technology in a Cournot duopoly 
with differentiated goods is analyzed
1
. In this paper we analyze optimal 
subsidization policies about adoption of new technology by firms. 
We consider the following three-stage game.   
    1.  The first stage: The government determines the level of subsidies to the firms.  
    2.  The second stage: The firms decide whether they adopt new technology or 
not.  
    3.  The third stage: The firms determine their outputs.  
Under absolute profit maximization at the sub-game perfect equilibrium after 
the second stage of the game one or two or no firm adopts new technology 
depending on the value of the set-up cost. Under relative profit maximization, if the 
set-up costs of firms are equal, at the sub-game perfect equilibrium two firms or no 
firm adopts new technology. On the other hand, if the set-up costs of firms are 
different, one or two or no firm adopts new technology under relative profit 
maximization. 
The social welfare is defined to be the sum of consumers’ utility minus 
productions costs including the set-up costs of new technology. There are various 
cases about optimal policies depending on the level of the set-up cost and whether 
the goods of the firms are substitutes or complements. Examples are as follows.   
    1.  The social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt new technology, but 
only one firm adopts new technology without subsidy. Then, the government 
should give subsidies to the firms.  
    2.  The social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt new technology, and 
both firms adopt new technology without subsidy. Then, the government should do 
nothing.  
 There are several other cases. In particular, under relative profit maximization 
there is the following case.  
 The social welfare is maximized when one firm adopts new technology, 
however, no firm adopts new technology without subsidy. Then, the government 
should give a subsidy to only one firm. It is a discriminatory policy. The 
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government gives a chance to receive a subsidy to only one firm. If both firms have 
a chance to receive a subsidy, both of them adopt new technology.  
In the next section we present a model of this paper. In Section 3 we analyze the 
optimal subsidy policy when firms maximize their absolute profits. In Section 4 we 
analyze the optimal subsidy policy when firms maximize their relative profits. 
 
2. The Model 
Two firms, Firm A and B, produce differentiated goods, and consider adoption 
of new technology from a foreign country. Technology itself is free, however, each 
firm must expend a fixed set-up cost for adoption of new technology, for example, 
education cost of its staff. Denote the outputs of Firm A and B by Ax  and Bx , the 
prices of their goods by Ap  and Bp . The utility function of consumers is assumed 
to be  
 
2 21 1= ( ) ,
2 2
A B A A B Bu a x x x bx x x     
 
where > 0a . If the goods of the firms are substitutes, 0 < <1b , and if the 
goods are complements, 1< < 0b . From this utility function the inverse demand 
functions of the goods are derived as follows.  
 
= ,A A Bp a x bx   
 
= .B B Ap a x bx   
 
The marginal cost before adoption of new technology is > 0c , and the 
marginal cost after adoption of new technology is zero. They are common to both 
firms. A fixed set-up cost is > 0e , which is also common. We assume >a c  and 
>
1
c
a
b
 so that the equilibrium outputs of the firms are positive under absolute 
and relative profit maximization. 
We analyze the optimal subsidy policies of the government for adoption of new 
technology by the firms under absolute and relative profit maximization. 
If adoption of new technology and non-adoption are indifferent for a firm, then 
it adopts new technology. 
 
3. Absolute profit maximization 
3.1.  Case of substitutes 
First we assume that the goods of the firms are substitutes. Then 0 < <1b . The 
case of complements is treated in the next subsection. 
The profits of Firm A and B before adoption of new technology are  
= ( ) ,A A B A Aa x bx x cx     
 
and  
 
= ( ) .B B A B Ba x bx x cx     
 
After adoption of new technology they are  
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= ( ) ,A A B Aa x bx x e     
 
and  
 
= ( ) .B B A Ba x bx x e     
 
We assume Cournot type behavior of firms. 
The conditions for profit maximization in the third stage of the game when both 
firms adopt new technology are  
 
2 = 0,A Ba x bx   
 
and  
 
2 = 0.B Aa x bx   
 
The equilibrium outputs are  
 
= = .
2
A B
a
x x
b
 
 
The prices of the goods are  
 
= = .
2
A B
a
p p
b
 
 
The profits of Firm A and B, A  and B , are  
 
2
2
= = .
(2 )
A B
a
e
b
  

 
 
The conditions for profit maximization when only Firm A adopts new technology 
are  
 
2 = 0,A Ba x bx   
 
and  
 
2 = 0.B Aa x bx c    
 
The equilibrium outputs are  
 
2
(2 )
= ,
4
A
b a bc
x
b
 

 
 
and  
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2
(2 ) 2
= .
4
B
b a c
x
b
 

 
 
The prices of the goods are  
 
2
(2 )
= ,
4
A
b a bc
p
b
 

 
 
and  
 
2
2
(2 ) (2 )
= .
4
B
b a b c
p
b
  

 
 
The profits of the firms are as follows.  
 
2
2 2
[(2 ) ]
= ,
(4 )
A
b a bc
e
b

 


 
 
and  
 
2
2 2
[(2 ) 2 ]
= .
(4 )
B
b a c
b

 

 
 
Similarly, the profits of the firms when only Firm B adopts new technology are  
 
2
2 2
[(2 ) 2 ]
= ,
(4 )
A
b a c
b

 

 
 
and  
 
2
2 2
[(2 ) ]
= .
(4 )
B
b a bc
e
b

 


 
 
The conditions for profit maximization when no firm adopts new technology are  
 
2 = 0,A Ba x bx c    
and  
 
2 = 0.B Aa x bx c    
 
The equilibrium outputs are  
 
= = .
2
A B
a c
x x
b


 
 
The prices of the goods are  
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(1 )
= = .
2
A B
a b c
p p
b
 

 
 
The profits of the firms are  
 
2
2
( )
= = .
(2 )
A B
a c
b
 


 
 
If  
 
2 2
2 2 2
[(2 ) 2 ]
,
(2 ) (4 )
a b a c
e
b b
 
 
 
 
 
the best response of each firm when the rival firm adopts new technology is 
adoption of new technology. Then, we have  
 
2 2
4 [(2 ) ]
.
(4 )
c b a c
e
b
 


 
 
If  
 
2 2
2 2 2
[(2 ) ] ( )
,
(4 ) (2 )
b a bc a c
e
b b
  
 
 
 
 
the best response of each firm when the rival firm does not adopt new technology 
is adoption of new technology. Then, we have  
 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
.
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  


 
 
Since 
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ] 4 [(2 ) ]
>
(4 ) (4 )
c b a b c c b a c
b b
    
 
, we get the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 Under absolute profit maximization when the goods are substitutes, 
the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game after the second stage are as follows.   
1.  If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) ]
(4 )
c b a c
e
b
 


, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is a state where 
both firms adopt new technology.  
2.  If 
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) ] 4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
<
(4 ) (4 )
c b a c c b a b c
e
b b
    

 
, the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium is a state where only one firm, A or B, adopts new technology. 
 
3.  If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
>
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  

, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is a state 
where no firm adopts new technology.  
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Social welfare 
The social welfare is equal to the sum of the profits of the firms and the 
consumers’ surplus. Denote the social welfare when both firms adopt new 
technology by 
2W , that when one firm (for example, Firm A) adopts new 
technology by 
1W and that when no firm adopts new technology by 0W . Then, we 
have 
 
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 (3 )
= ( ) 2 = 2 ,
2 2 (2 )
A B A A B B
b a
W a x x x bx x x e e
b

     

 
 
1 2 21 1= ( )
2 2
A B A A B BW ax a c x x bx x x e       
2 2 2
2 2
2 ( )(3 )(2 ) (12 )
= ,
2(4 )
a a c b b b c
e
b
    


 
  
and  
2
0 2 2
2
1 1 (3 )( )
= ( )( ) = .
2 2 (2 )
A B A A B B
b a c
W a c x x x bx x x
b
 
    

 
 
Let  
2 3 2 3
0 1 0
2 2
(24 16 2 2 12 16 2 )
= = ,
2(4 )
a ab ab ab c bc b c b c c
e W W e
b
      
 

 
 
and  
 
2 3 2
1 2 1
2 2
(24 16 2 2 12 )
= = .
2(4 )
a ab ab ab c b c c
e W W e
b
    
 

 
 
Then, if and only if 
0e e , 1 0W W , and if and only if 1e e , 2 1W W . 
We have 
 
2 2
0 1
2 2
(8 )
= > 0.
(4 )
b bc
e e
b



 
 
Thus, we obtain the following lemma.  
Lemma 2 Under absolute profit maximization, when the goods are substitutes;   
1.  If 
1e e , 2W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by both 
firms is optimal;  
2.  If 
1 0<e e e , 1W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by one 
firm is optimal;  
3.  If 
0>e e , 0W  is the maximum, and non-adoption of new technology is 
optimal.  
 We find  
2 2
1
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ] [2 (1 )(4 ) ( 8 4) ]
= > 0.
(4 ) 2(4 )
c b a b c a b b b b c c
e
b b
       

 
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and  
 
1
2 2
4 [(2 ) ] (2 2 )
= > 0.
(4 ) 2(2 )(2 )
c b a c a ab c c
e
b b b
   

  
 
These inequalities are obtained from the assumption of >a c  and >
1
c
a
b
. 
Then, we get the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. Under absolute profit maximization when the goods of the firms 
are substitutes, the optimal policies should be as follows;   
 1. If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) ]
(4 )
c b a c
e
b
 


, 
2W  is optimal and both firms adopt new 
technology without subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
2. If 
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) ] 4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
<
(4 ) (4 )
c b a c c b a b c
e
b b
    

 
, 
2W  is optimal, however, 
one firm adopts new technology without subsidy. The government should give 
subsidies to the firms. The level of the subsidy to each firm is  
 
2 2
4 [(2 ) ]
.
(4 )
c b a c
e
b
 


 
 
The government must give subsidies to both firms because the best response of 
a firm is non-adoption when the rival firm adopts new technology without subsidy.  
3. If 
1
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
<
(4 )
c b a b c
e e
b
  


, 
2W  is optimal, however, no firm adopts 
new technology without subsidy. The government should give subsidies to both 
firms. The level of the subsidy to each firm is  
 
2 2
4 [(2 ) ]
.
(4 )
c b a c
e
b
 

  
 
It is not 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  


, and  
 
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) ] 4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
> .
(4 ) (4 )
c b a c c b a b c
e e
b b
    
 
 
 
 
4.  If 
1 0<e e e , 1W  is optimal, however, no firm adopts new technology 
without subsidy. The government should give subsidies to the firms. The level of 
the subsidy is  
 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
.
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  


 
 
The government give a chance to receive a subsidy to both firms, but actually 
gives a subsidy to one of the firms which adopts new technology. It is not a 
discriminatory policy. Each firm does not have an incentive to receive a subsidy 
when the other firm receives a subsidy and adopts new technology.  
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5.  If 
0>e e , 0W  is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without 
subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
3.2.  Case of complements 
If the goods are complements, 1< < 0b . Then, we have  
 
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ] 4 [(2 ) ]
< ,
(4 ) (4 )
c b a b c c b a c
b b
    
 
 
 
and  
 
0 1 < 0.e e  
 
Let  
 
2 0
2
1 (2 )(3 )
= ( 2 ) = .
2 2(2 )
a c b c
e W W e
b
 
 

 
 
If and only if e e , 2 0W W . We have  
 
2 2
0
2 2
( 8)
= > 0,
2(2 ) (2 )
b b c
e e
b b


 
 
 
and  
 
2 2
1
2 2
( 8)
= > 0.
2(2 ) (2 )
b b c
e e
b b


 
 
 
The signs of them are due to 1< < 0b . 
Lemma 1 is modified as follows.  
Lemma 3. Under absolute profit maximization when the goods are 
complements, the subgame-perfect equilibria are as follows.   
1. If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  


, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is a state 
where both firms adopt new technology.  
2. If 
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ] 4 [(2 ) ]
<
(4 ) (4 )
c b a b c c b a c
e
b b
    

 
, there are two subgame-
perfect equilibria. One is a state where both firms adopt new technology, and the 
other is a state where no firm adopts new technology. 
3. If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) ]
>
(4 )
c b a c
e
b
 

, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is a state where no 
firm adopts new technology.  
Also Lemma 2 is modified as follows.  
Lemma 4. When the goods are complements;   
1.  if e e  ( 0e e  or 0 <e e e ), 2W  is the maximum, and adoption of new 
technology by both firms is optimal;  
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2.  if >e e  ( 1<e e e  or 1>e e ), 0W  is the maximum, and non-adoption of 
new technology is optimal.  
 
 We find, if >a c  
 
3 2 3 2
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) ] (8 8 2 2 8 4 )
= > 0,
(4 ) 2(2 ) (2 )
c b a c a ab ab ab b c b c bc c c
e
b b b
        

  
 
and  
 
3 2 3 2
2 2 2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ] (8 8 2 2 4 )
= > 0.
(4 ) 2(2 ) (2 )
c b a b c a ab ab ab b c b c c c
e
b b b
        

  
 
Thus, we get the following theorem.  
Theorem 2. Under absolute profit maximization when the goods of the firms 
are complements, the optimal policies should be as follows.   
1.  If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  


, 
2W  is optimal and both firms adopt new 
technology without subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
2.  If 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
<
(4 )
c b a b c
e e
b
  


, 
2W  is optimal but no firm may adopt 
new technology without subsidy. The government should give subsidies to both 
firms. The level of the subsidy to each firm is  
 
2 2
4 [(2 ) (1 ) ]
.
(4 )
c b a b c
e
b
  


 
 
Both firms may adopt new technology without subsidy. However, they may not 
adopt. Subsidization to the firms does not reduce the social welfare. 
 
3.  If >e e , 0W  is optimal and no firm adopts new technology. The 
government should do nothing.  
 
4.  Relative profit maximization 
4.1.  Case of substitutes 
In this section we assume that the set-up costs of the firms may be different 
because the government may adopt a discriminatory policy. In such a policy the 
government gives a chance to receive a subsidy to only Firm A. The set-up costs of 
Firm A and B are denoted by Ae  and Be , and the subsidy is denoted by s . When 
the government gives a subsidy to only Firm A,  
 
= ,Ae e s  
 
and  
 
= .Be e  
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When the government gives subsidies to both firms,  
 
= = ,A Be e e s  
 
and when the government gives a subsidy to no firm, 
  
= = .A Be e e  
 
Thus, A Be e  in any case. 
The relative profit of each firm is defined to be the difference between its profit 
and the profit of its rival firm. Denote the relative profits of Firm A and B by A  
and B . When both firms adopt new technology, we have  
 
= ( ) ( ) ,A A B A A B A B Ba x bx x e a x bx x e         
 
and  
 
= = ( ) ( ) .B A B A B B A B A Aa x bx x e a x bx x e          
 
The conditions for relative profit maximization are  
 
2 = 0,Aa x  
 
and  
 
2 = 0.Ba x  
 
The equilibrium outputs are  
 
= = .
2
A B
a
x x  
 
The prices of the goods are  
 
(1 )
= = .
2
A B
b a
p p

 
 
The absolute profits of the firms are as follows.  
 
2(1 )
= ,
4
A A
b a
e

  
 
and  
 
2(1 )
= .
4
B B
b a
e

  
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The relative profits of the firms are  
 
= = .A B A Be e     
 
When no firm adopts new technology,  
 
= ( ) ( ) ,A A B A A B A B Ba x bx x cx a x bx x cx         
 
and  
 
= = ( ) ( ) .B A B A B B A B A Aa x bx x cx a x bx x cx          
 
The conditions for relative profit maximization are  
 
2 = 0,Aa x c   
 
and  
 
2 = 0.Ba x c   
 
The equilibrium outputs are  
 
= = .
2
A B
a c
x x

 
 
The prices of the goods are  
 
(1 ) (1 )
= = .
2
A B
b a b c
p p
  
 
 
The absolute profits of the firms are as follows.  
 
2(1 )( )
= = .
4
A B
b a c
 
 
 
 
The relative profits of the firms are  
 
= = 0.A B   
 
When only Firm A adopts new technology,  
 
= ( ) ( ) ,A A B A A B A B Ba x bx x e a x bx x cx         
 
and  
 
= = ( ) ( ) .B A B A B B A B A Aa x bx x cx a x bx x e          
 
The conditions for relative profit maximization are  
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2 = 0,Aa x  
and  
 
2 = 0.Ba x c   
 
The equilibrium outputs are  
 
= ,
2
A
a
x  
 
and  
 
= .
2
B
a c
x

 
 
The prices of the goods are  
 
(1 )
= ,
2
A
b a bc
p
 
 
 
and  
 
(1 )
= .
2
B
b a c
p
 
 
 
The absolute profits of the firms are  
 
[(1 ) ]
= ,
4
A A
a b a bc
e
 
  
 
 
and  
( )[(1 ) ]
= .
4
B
a c b a c

  
 
 
The relative profits of the firms are 
 
 
[(1 ) ] ( )[(1 ) ] (2 )
= = ,
4 4 4
A A A
a b a bc a c b a c a c c
e e
     
     
 
and  
 
(2 )
= .
4
B A
a c c
e

    
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By the assumption of >
1
c
a
b
 the absolute profit of each firm is positive. If 
(2 )
<
4
A
a c c
e

, we have > 0A  and < 0B , if 
(2 )
>
4
A
a c c
e

, we have 
< 0A  and > 0B . When only Firm B adopts new technology, the absolute 
profits of the firms are  
 
( )[(1 ) ]
= ,
4
A
a c b a c

  
 
 
and  
 
[(1 ) ]
= .
4
B B
a b a bc
e
 
  
 
The relative profits of the firms are  
 
[(1 ) ] ( )[(1 ) ] (2 )
= = ,
4 4 4
A B B
a b a bc a c b a c a c c
e e
     
       
 
and  
 
(2 )
= .
4
B B
a c c
e

   
 
The game after the second stage is depicted as follows. 
 
                                              B 
 
 
 
 
A 
 adoption of new technology non-adoption 
adoption of new 
technology 
BA ee   
 
AB ee   
Ae
cca



4
)2(
 
Ae
cca


4
)2(  
non-adoption 
Be
cca


4
)2(
 
Be
cca



4
)2(  
                       0 
 
 
      0 
 
 
If 
(2 )
0
4
A
a c c
e

  , adoption of new technology is a dominant strategy for 
Firm A, and if 
(2 )
< 0
4
A
a c c
e

 , non-adoption is a dominant strategy for Firm 
A. Similarly, if 
(2 )
0
4
B
a c c
e

  , adoption of new technology is a dominant 
strategy for Firm B, and if 
(2 )
< 0
4
B
a c c
e

 , non-adoption is a dominant 
strategy for Firm B. Thus, we obtain the following lemma.  
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Lemma 5. Under relative profit maximization, when the government gives a 
subsidy to only Firm A, we have <A Be e , and the sub-game perfect equilibria are 
as follows.   
1.  If 
(2 )
4
B
a c c
e

 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where both 
firms adopt new technology.  
2.  If 
(2 )
<
4
A B
a c c
e e

 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where 
only Firm A adopts new technology.  
3.  If 
(2 )
>
4
A
a c c
e

, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where no firm 
adopts new technology.  
 On the other hand, if the government gives a subsidy to no firm, or gives the 
same subsidies to both firms, we have =A Be e , and the sub-game perfect equilibria 
are as follows.   
1.  If 
(2 )
4
A
a c c
e

 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where both 
firms adopt new technology.  
2.  If 
(2 )
>
4
A
a c c
e

, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where no firm 
adopts new technology.  
This lemma holds whether the goods of the firm are substitutes or complements. 
Social welfare 
Assume that the goods of the firms are substitutes. Denote the social welfare 
when both firms adopt new technology by 
2W , that when one firm adopts new 
technology by 
1W , and that when no firm adopts new technology by 0W . Then, 
we have  
 
2
2 2 21 1 (3 )= ( ) 2 = 2 ,
2 2 4
A B A A B B
b a
W a x x x bx x x e e

       
 
2 2 2
1 2 21 1 3 2 6 2 6= ( ) = ,
2 2 8
A B A A B B
c abc ac a b a
W ax a c x x bx x x e e
   
        
 
and  
 
2
0 2 21 1 (3 )( )= ( )( ) = .
2 2 4
A B A A B B
b a c
W a c x x x bx x x
 
      
 
Let  
 
0 1 0 (6 2 2 3 )= = ,
8
c a ab bc c
e W W e
  
    
 
and  
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1 2 1 (6 2 3 )= = .
8
c a ab c
e W W e
 
    
 
Then, if and only if 
0e e  , 1 0W W  , and if and only if 1e e  , 2 1W W  . 
We have  
 
2
0 1 = > 0.
4
bc
e e   
 
Thus, we obtain the following lemma.  
Lemma 6 Under relative profit maximization, when the goods of the firms are 
substitutes;   
1.  If 
1e e  , 2W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by both 
firms is optimal.  
2.  If 
1 0<e e e  , 1W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by one 
firm is optimal.  
3.  If 
0>e e , 0W  is the maximum, and non-adoption of new technology is 
optimal.  
We find  
 
0 (2 ) (2 2 2 )= > 0,
4 8
a c c a ab b c c
e
   
  
 
and  
 
1 (2 ) (2 2 )= > 0.
4 8
a c c a ab c c
e
  
  
 
Thus, we get the following theorem.  
Theorem 3 Under relative profit maximization when the goods of the firms are 
substitutes, the optimal policies should be as follows.   
1.  If 
(2 )
4
a c c
e

 , 2W  is optimal and both firms adopt new technology 
without subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
2.  If 
1(2 ) <
4
a c c
e e

  , 2W  is optimal, however, no firm adopts new 
technology without subsidy. The government should give subsidies to both firms. 
The level of the subsidy to each firm is  
 
(2 )
.
4
a c c
e

  
 
3.  If 
1 0<e e e  , 1W  is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without 
subsidy. The government should give a subsidy to only one firm. It is a 
discriminatory policy. The government gives a chance to receive a subsidy to only 
Firm A. If both firms have a chance to receive a subsidy, they adopt new 
technology. The level of the subsidy to Firm A is  
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(2 )
.
4
a c c
e

  
 
4.  If 
0>e e , 0W  is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without 
subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
4.2.  Case of complements 
If the goods of the firms are complements, then we have  
 
0 1 < 0.e e   
 
Let  
 
 * 2 0
1 (2 )(3 )
= 2 = .
2 8
a c b c
e W W e
 
    
 
Then,  
 
2
1 * = > 0,
8
bc
e e   
 
and  
 
2
* 0 = > 0.
8
bc
e e   
 
The signs of them are due to < 0b . 
Lemma 5 is not changed, however Lemma 6 is modified as follows;  
Lemma 7. Under relative profit maximization, when the goods of the firms are 
complements;   
1.  If 
*e e  ( 0e e   or 0 *<e e e ), 2W  is the maximum, and adoption of 
new technology by both firms is optimal.  
2.  If 
*>e e  ( * 1<e e e   or 1>e e ), 0W  is the maximum, and non-adoption of 
new technology is optimal.  
We find  
 
 
* (2 ) (2 )(3 ) (2 ) (2 )(1 )= = > 0.
4 8 4 8
a c c a c b c a c c a c b c
e
     
   
 
Thus, we get the following theorem.  
Theorem 4 Under relative profit maximization when the goods of the firms are 
complements, the optimal policies should be as follows.   
1.  If 
(2 )
4
a c c
e

 , 2W  is optimal and both firms adopt new technology 
without subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
2.  If 
*(2 ) <
4
a c c
e e

 , 2W  is optimal but no firm adopts new technology 
without subsidy. The government should give subsidies to the firms. The level of 
the subsidy to each firm is  
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(2 )
.
4
a c c
e

  
 
3.  If 
*>e e , 0W  is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without 
subsidy. The government should do nothing.  
In the future we will study a game of subsidization for adoption of new 
technology between countries in an international duopoly. 
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